Thursday, March 15, 2007

Cross-National Variation in Political Violence

Muller, Edward N., and Erich Weede. "Cross-National Variation in Political Violence: A Rational
     Action Approach." Journal Of Conflict Resolution 34 (Dec. 1990): 1-29. California Digital
     Library. 15 Mar. 2007 . 


"act of coercion, on one hand, reduce legal opportunities for contesting governmental policies and thereby raise the demand for illegal and violence collective action." (pg. 13)
in my own words: when a government is forceful and imposes laws that punish people for protest, they do not give them legal opportunities to express their dissenting opinions. because they don't have a legal outlet to protest peacefully, those against the regime will resort to violent (and clearly illegal) action. take away one option, and those desperate enough will find another. terrorists are typically extremely devoted to their cause and will do anything to get their message across. if the government takes away legal options to protest, the terrorists will be forced to resort to violence.


(pg. 24) "under a highly repressive regime it is likely that opportunities for collective political action of any kind will be low, that the probability of success will be negligible, and that costs will be high. rational actors who wish to contest the policies of a government are likely to think better of it. under a nonrepressive regime, it is likely that opportunities for collective political action of any kind will be high, that the probability of success of peaceful collective action will typically be higher than that of violence, and that hte costs of peaceful action will be much lower than those of violence. rational actors therefore are likely to prefer peaceful collective action to violence."
in my own words: an authoritarian, repressive government doesn't give the citizens much chance to give input, and they don't give a lot of room for compromise. in so many words, they are unbreakable. so, there is really a very little chance that collective political action will be successful. therefore, benefits are low. costs are high because repressive governments may punish protesters.
more democratic governments are more open to public opinion and take into consideration what their constituents want. basically, where protesters see "holes" in the government, or places where they can influence governmental decision, they will understand that their protest may have an affect. therefore, the benefits of peaceful collective action are high. the costs are low, because in a politically open nation, they have the right to protest.

(pg. 26) "since rational actors are more likely to rebel after they have mobilized the necessary resources, potential separatism therefore should increase violence."
in my own words: it's difficult to mobilize people. separatism gives people a big reason to ban together and it is quite a strong reason (much more so than, say, a desire for clean air for the future). once people group together under separatist groups, there is a collective rationality. where it might not have been rational to protest (violently or otherwise) individually, people may see a benefit in acting as a member of a group, for the good of the group. these separatist groups are usually radical and they may stop at nothing to get what they want. massive numbers combined with radicalism leads to more violence.

(pg. 22) "...semirepressive regimes, intermediate levels of negative sanctions, and potential separatism increase the incidence of violence."
in my own words: regimes that are slightly repressive and the potential for separatism in a nation increase violence for reasons stated above.


YESSS. this is exactly what i've been looking for.

No comments: